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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to 
Section 78-2-2, Utah Code Annotated. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether Nicholls has failed to "marshal the evi-
dence" in support of the district court's findings of fact and to 
show that the findings are "clearly erroneous?" 
2. Whether the findings of fact and conclusions of 
law entered by the district court are consistent with and sup-
ported by the evidence adduced at trial? 
3. Whether the district court properly denied 
Nicholls' motions for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Nicholls' credibility was at issue and that there existed a genu-
ine issue of material fact — namely, whether Nicholls' Travelers 
Cheques had been lost or stolen? 
4. Whether the district court correctly taxed costs 
against Nicholls? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
Richard Douglas Nicholls ("Nicholls") purchased $99,000 
of American Express Travelers Cheques in his home town of 
Toronto, Canada, Nicholls later claimed that the Travelers 
Cheques had been lost or stolen and demanded that American 
Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. ("American 
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Express"), the issuer of the Cheques, issue a refund or replace 
the Travelers Cheques. American Express denied the claim because 
of many suspicious circumstances surrounding it. Nicholls then 
brought suit against American Express in Utah, asserting claims 
for (1) breach of contract, (2) mental anguish and distress, 
(3) negligence and reckless indifferences, (4) conversion, and 
(5) constructive fraud. 
Shortly after Nicholls filed the Complaint, he filed a 
motion for summary judgment arguing that American Express 
breached its contract with Nicholls by refusing to issue a refund 
or to replace the Travelers Cheques. American Express filed a 
responsive memorandum supported by Rule 56(f) affidavits of Mark 
S. Webber, counsel for American Express, and Bruce Barr, the 
American Express Corporate Security Manager in Toronto. American 
Express argued that summary judgment should be denied because the 
case involved material issues of fact that turned on Nicholls' 
credibility or, in the alternative, the motion was premature and 
should be continued to allow American Express an opportunity to 
complete its investigation and discovery. The hearing was post-
poned until further discovery was completed. On March 9, 1992, 
the hearing was held and the district court denied the motion for 
summary judgment on the bases that Nicholls' credibility was at 
issue and that a factual issue existed as to whether the Cheques 
had, in fact, been lost or stolen. Nicholls subsequently filed 
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another motion for summary judgment arguing that Nicholls/ credi-
bility should not be an issue in a motion for summary judgment. 
On June 23, 1992, the court again denied the motion on the same 
bases. 
A two-day bench trial was held on July 7 and 8, 1992. 
On July 14, 1992, after hearing all the evidence adduced at trial 
and after judging the credibility of Nicholls and of the other 
witnesses, the district court announced its bench ruling in favor 
of American Express. (R. 1613-1625, 1033-1041, Addendum 3). As 
evidenced by the record, the court viewed the case as turning on 
the credibility of Nicholls. For numerous reasons stated on the 
record, the court did not believe Nicholls' testimony and specif-
ically found that the Travelers Cheques had not been lost or sto-
len. Accordingly, the court also found that American Express did 
not breach the purchase agreements entered into at the time 
Nicholls purchased the Travelers Cheques and did not engage in 
any tortious conduct against Nicholls. 
On August 12, 1992, American Express filed a motion to 
tax costs against Nicholls. On August 14, 1992, Nicholls filed a 
Notice of Objections to the Proposed Findings, Conclusions and 
Judgment. On September 4, 1992, Nicholls filed a Notice of 
Motions, Motion for New Trial, Motion to Set Aside Judgment, 
Motion for Judgment for Plaintiff. On September 21, 1992, the 
district court heard all of Nicholls' objections to the findings, 
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conclusions and judgment and all of his post-trial motions. The 
court granted American Express7 motion to tax costs, denied 
Nicholls' various post-trial motions and overruled all of 
Nicholls' objections to the findings, conclusions and judgment. 
The findings, conclusions and judgment submitted by American 
Express were entered on August 28, 1992. (R. 103 3-1038, 
1039-1041, Addendums 1 and 2) . In this appeal Nicholls is 
challenging all of the foregoing determinations. 
B. Statement of Facts 
The following facts were adduced at trial and support 
the district court's findings, conclusions, and judgment: 
1. On May 8, 1990, Nicholls purchased $17,000 worth 
of American Express Travelers Cheques. He testified he took them 
to his office and placed them in his unlocked desk drawer. He 
said he did not tell anyone that he had purchased the Cheques or 
that he had put them in the desk drawer. (R. 656, 1226, 1250). 
2. On Wednesday, May 30, 1990, Nicholls purchased an 
additional $82,000 worth of American Express Travelers Cheques. 
He testified that prior to going to the American Express office 
in Toronto, Canada to purchase the Travelers Cheques, he removed 
the $17,000 in Travelers Cheques from his desk drawer and placed 
them in his briefcase. He said he took the briefcase with him to 
the American Express office and, after purchasing the $82,000 in 
Cheques, placed them in the briefcase with the $17,000 in 
Cheques. He said the briefcase also contained two or three 
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credit cards and a driver's license. After leaving the American 
Express office, Nicholls placed the briefcase into the trunk of 
his car. (R. 657, 1230, 1275-1278). 
3. Nicholls testified he purchased the Travelers 
Cheques to buy equipment for his business at an auction he 
planned to attend in Sweden on Tuesday, June 5, 1990. He said he 
bought the Cheques on Wednesday, even though he was not scheduled 
to leave the country until Sunday, June 3, because he wanted to 
be organized for this important buying trip. (R. 1276, 1278). 
4. Nicholls had never before used Travelers Cheques 
to purchase equipment at auctions. (R. 1279). 
5. Nicholls testified that after purchasing the 
$82,000 in Travelers Cheques, he returned to his office later 
that afternoon and left the briefcase containing the Cheques in 
the trunk of his car. He said that after closing his office 
later that afternoon, he went home and again left the briefcase 
in the trunk. (R. 1280). 
6. Nicholls testified that from the time he purchased 
the Cheques on Wednesday, May 30, until the time he arrived at 
the airport on Sunday, June 3, he never checked in his trunk for 
the briefcase containing the Travelers Cheques. (R. 1281-1284). 
7. Nicholls testified he never observed any evidence 
that the trunk had been broken into. (R. 1281). 
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8. Nicholls testified that before leaving for the 
airport on Sunday, June 3, 1990, he packed his suitcase and 
placed several items in a leather folder that he intended to take 
with him. He said he put the suitcase into the trunk of his car 
and drove to the airport. He said his briefcase was still in the 
trunk of his car when he opened the trunk and placed his suitcase 
in it. However, he said he did not open the briefcase to confirm 
the Cheques were still there. (R. 1282-1284). 
9. Nicholls testified he kept the briefcase with him 
on the flight because he was concerned about the safety of the 
Cheques. However, not once during the seven hour flight did he 
open the briefcase to verify that it still contained the 
all-important Travelers Cheques. (R. 1283-1284). 
10. Nicholls testified that on Monday, June 4, 1990, 
he arrived in Sweden. He said he rented a car, drove to the 
hotel, and used a credit card rather than Travelers Cheques to 
pay for the hotel and the rental car. He said the credit card 
that he used to pay for the hotel and the rental car was not one 
of the credit cards that was in the briefcase. (R. 1284-1285). 
11. Nicholls testified that after checking into his 
hotel, he took the briefcase with him to his room, but at no time 
that evening or night did he open his briefcase to verify the 
Travelers Cheques were still there. (R. 1285). 
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12. Nicholls testified that on Tuesday, June 5, 1990, 
he drove to the site of the auction. He said that he inspected 
the forklift trucks, attended the auction, and bid on ten or 
twelve pieces of equipment, but that he did not have the high bid 
on any piece of equipment. He did not buy anything at the auc-
tion. He said during the time he was inspecting the equipment 
and bidding on it, the briefcase remained in the rental car. (R. 
1285-1286). 
13. Nicholls testified he left the auction, returned 
to the hotel room shortly after lunch, and checked out. He said 
he then drove to Stockholm, Sweden and spent the night at the 
Stockholm Hotel. He said he took the briefcase with him into his 
hotel room, but again, he supposedly did not open the briefcase 
to verify that the Cheques were there. (R. 1285-1286). 
14. He testified that on Wednesday, June 6, he checked 
out of the hotel, drove to the airport, and took a return flight 
to Toronto, Canada. Again, he said he kept the briefcase with 
him during the return flight and, again, he said not once during 
the flight did he open the briefcase to see if the Travelers 
Cheques were there. (R. 1288). 
15. Nicholls testified that when he arrived to Toronto 
on the evening of June 6, he placed the suitcase and briefcase in 
the trunk of his car and drove home. He said that upon arriving 
home, he took the briefcase and suitcase into his house. He said 
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he did not open the briefcase that night to see if the Cheques 
were there. (R. 1288). 
16. Nicholls testified that on Thursday, June 7, he 
went to work but did not take the briefcase with him. He said 
that on Friday, June 8, he took the briefcase with him to work, 
and that at about mid-morning he opened the briefcase and discov-
ered for the first time that the Cheques were missing. (R. 
1289). 
17. On Friday, June 8, 1990, Nicholls called the Salt 
Lake City Office of American Express and reported that the 
Cheques had allegedly been lost or stolen. On June 17, 1990, he 
made written demand on American Express for either a refund of 
the $99,000 or replacement Cheques. (R. 657, 1290). 
18. American Express asked Nicholls for two refer-
ences, and Nicholls gave the names of George Valante and Len 
Jones. (R. 1290). 
19. Mr. Valante had been a friend of Nicholls for 
eight to ten years and had done some bookkeeping work for him. 
Mr. Valante was the boyfriend of Debbie Jones, who was Nicholls7 
bookkeeper and the person who had loaned Nicholls $20,000, which 
was part of the money that Nicholls used to obtain the $99,000 
worth of Travelers Cheques. Valante was one of three owners of 
Nicholls7 company in 1990. (R. 1290-1291). 
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20. Mr. Jones had been a friend of Nicholls for 
approximately ten years. Mr. Jones owned an insurance brokerage 
and had been Nicholls7 insurance agent for ten years. (R. 
1291-1292). 
21. Pursuant to American Express7 instructions, on 
Saturday, June 9, Nicholls called the Toronto police and reported 
the loss of the Travelers Cheques. (R. 657). 
22. Mr. Bruce Barr ("Barr"), the American Express Cor-
porate Security officer in Toronto, investigated Nicholls7 claim. 
On Wednesday, June 13, 1990, Barr met with Nicholls and Nicholls7 
Toronto counsel at the American Express office in Toronto. 
Nicholls told Barr that from the time he purchased the Cheques on 
May 30, 1990, until the time he reported them as being lost or 
stolen, to his knowledge no one else had seen or handled the 
Cheques. Barr made inquires through the security offices of 
local banks and trust companies in the Toronto area regarding any 
association with Nicholls, and he visited all 22 of the locations 
where the Cheques had been cashed. (R. 1224-1228, 1230-1235). 
23. $87,000 worth of the Travelers Cheques were cashed 
at 22 different locations throughout the Toronto area. $39,000 
worth were cashed at 13 different locations on Thursday, May 31, 
1990; $18,000 worth were cashed at six different locations on 
Friday, June 1, 1990; $9,000 worth were cashed at two different 
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locations on Monday, June 4, 1990; and $21,000 worth were cashed 
at two different locations on Thursday, June 7, 1990. (R. 658). 
24. Based on his investigation of the claim, Barr was 
suspicious of Nicholls and believed the claim to be fraudulent. 
He recommended that American Express deny the claim, and American 
Express followed this recommendation. (R. 658, 1235). 
25. On August 15, 1990, Nicholls filed a civil action 
in Utah against American Express, alleging breach of contract and 
tortious misconduct. (R. 2). 
26. Barr prepared a written report of his investiga-
tion and, on August 29, 1990, he met with the Toronto Police and 
submitted his report. (R. 1236, 1483). 
27. The case was assigned to Detective Peter Baxter 
("Baxter") of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department. Baxter 
was a detective assigned to the fraud and forgery squad of the 
police department, where he had worked for 23 years. (R. 1482). 
28. A large quantity of American Express Travelers 
Cheques were delivered with the report, and both the report and 
the Cheques were given to Baxter. (R. 1488). 
29. On November 2, 1990, Nicholls was deposed in Salt 
Lake City. His testimony included a statement that from the time 
he purchased the $82,000 on Wednesday, May 30, 1990 until the 
time he allegedly discovered them missing on Friday, June 8, 
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1990, no one to his knowledge had either seen or handled the 
Travelers Cheques. (R. 1296). 
30. On Friday, September 21, 1990, Baxter sent the 
Travelers Cheques included with the report to the Document Sec-
tion of the Forensic Identification Services of the Toronto 
Police Department to have the Cheques examined for fingerprints. 
(R. 658, 1488). 
31. After examining the Cheques, on March 11, 1991, 
the police identified fingerprints on them belonging to Mr. Paul 
Pauze (77Pauze77), a long-time business associate and friend of 
Nicholls. (R. 658, 1501-1502). 
32. The fingerprints of Pauze were found on both the 
Cheques purchased on May 8, which initially had been placed in 
Nicholls7 desk drawer, and the Cheques purchased on May 30, which 
were supposedly placed in Nicholls7 briefcase and kept in his 
trunk. (R. 658, 1504). 
33. Pauze and Nicholls had been friends and business 
associates for 10 years. Pauze and his wife and Nicholls and his 
wife would occasionally get together at one another7s house for 
barbecues or drinks. (R. 1326). 
34. Pauze and Nicholls have gone to Atlantic City on 
gambling trips on three separate occasions and have also gone to 
Las Vegas together. In fact, at least one and maybe two of the 
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gambling trips occurred after Pauze had been arrested and accused 
of stealing Nicholls7 Travelers Cheques. (R. 1326-1327). 
35. After learning that Pauze's fingerprints were 
found on both groups of Cheques, on July 17, 1991, Baxter met 
with Nicholls and his counsel to review the report submitted by 
Barr and to confirm that Nicholls knew of no one who had touched 
or seen the Travelers Cheques. Baxter took to the meeting a page 
of type-written points he needed to cover with Nicholls. They 
went through these points one by one. Baxter did not tell 
Nicholls about Pauze's prints being found on the Cheques. 
Nicholls and his counsel made a few changes to the points Baxter 
had prepared, and confirmed the accuracy of them. According to 
Nicholls, no one else knew that he had purchased the Cheques and, 
to his knowledge, they had never been handled by, or been in the 
possession of, anyone else. (R. 1512-1517). 
36. Baxter also interviewed one of the witnesses in 
Barr's report. The witness was a bank teller by the name of 
Marija Griparic. Ms. Griparic recognized the Travelers Cheques 
and the signatures on them. She provided Baxter with a descrip-
tion of the person who had cashed the Cheques. Baxter then 
showed Ms. Griparic a photo line-up and asked her if the person 
who had cashed the Cheques was in the photo line-up. Ms. 
Griparic identified the photograph of Pauze. (R. 1505-1512). 
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37. On July 24, 1991, Baxter arrested Pauze and 
charged him with fraud, possession of property obtained by crime, 
and uttering a forged document. (R. 1517-1519). 
38. At the time Pauze was arrested, Baxter told him 
that his fingerprints had been found on Nicholls7 Travelers 
Cheques. Pauze told Baxter that his fingerprints were on the 
Cheques because he had handled the Cheques while in Nicholls7 
office. He said that he had dropped by to see Nicholls and that 
Nicholls had showed him a large quantity of Travelers Cheques. 
He told Baxter that in disbelief he picked up the Travelers 
Cheques and handled them. Pauze did not say that anyone other 
than Nicholls was in the office when he supposedly handled the 
Cheques. (R. 1519-1521). 
39. After arresting Pauze, Baxter immediately called 
Nicholls to confirm again that no one had seen or touched his 
Travelers Cheques. Nicholls confirmed it. Baxter then told 
Nicholls that Pauze7s fingerprints had been found on the Cheques 
and that Pauze had been arrested. Nicholls did not comment. 
Barr told Nicholls that Nicholls would be the complainant and 
would be expected to give evidence in court as the victim in this 
matter. (R. 1521-1522). 
40. On October 22, 1991, Baxter prepared a summary of 
Nicholls7 anticipated testimony against Pauze. This summary — 
referred to as a 77will-say77 statement — was based on information 
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in the report and on information obtained from Baxter's meeting 
with Nicholls and his lawyer on July 17, 1991. Baxter sent the 
statement to Nicholls and his counsel and asked them to review it 
for accuracy. (R. 1522-1524). 
41. The following day, October 23, 1991, Nicholls 
faxed a letter to Baxter stating that Baxter was continuing to 
pressure him into signing the statement and that the statement 
was inaccurate and misleading and did not state the whole truth. 
(R. 50, 1523-1525). 
42. After Baxter's receipt of the faxed letter, Baxter 
telephoned Nicholls to discuss the proposed statement. Baxter 
tape-recorded the conversation because the letter he had received 
from Nicholls was very suspicious and because he wanted his part-
ner to be able to hear the conversation with Nicholls. The let-
ter from Nicholls referred to a letter from Baxter demanding that 
Nicholls sign the statement, when in fact Baxter had not asked 
Nicholls to sign it. (R. 1524-1525, Exhibit 18-D). 
43. When Nicholls was examined at trial about his 
telephone conversation with Baxter, Nicholls stated that Baxter 
screamed at him and threatened him that if he did not sign the 
proposed statement he was going to make sure he did not get his 
money back in his Utah lawsuit. (R. 1344, 1359-1366). 
44. Baxter's tape-recording of the conversation was 
then played to the court. It demonstrated that Baxter never 
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screamed or made any threats against Nicholls. It also demon-
strated that Baxter never demanded that Nicholls sign the state-
ment. On the contrary, it showed that Baxter told Nicholls that 
he had never asked him to sign the statement, but simply repeat-
edly asked Nicholls to specify what was wrong with the statement 
so that corrections could be made. The tape-recording clearly 
evidenced Nicholls' refusal to do so. (R. 1528, Exhibits 18-D 
and 19-D). 
45. Baxter learned that Pauze was scheduled to appear 
in court on October 29, 1991. Baxter contacted four bank tellers 
that he wanted to call as witnesses to identify Pauze as the per-
son who cashed the Cheques. He asked the bank tellers to come to 
court that day to see if they could positively identify Pauze. 
They agreed to meet at the court prior to the hearing. When they 
arrived at the court, they learned that Pauze's hearing had been 
held at an earlier time, so they were unable to see Pauze. At 
that time, though, Baxter asked the bank tellers to identify the 
Travelers Cheques that had been cashed by Pauze and also showed 
the bank tellers the photo line-up. All of the bank tellers 
identified Pauze as the person who had cashed the Travelers 
Cheques at issue. (R. 1528-1529, Exhibit 17-D). 
46. Baxter subsequently spoke with one other bank 
teller who also identified Pauze as the person who had cashed the 
Cheques. (R. 1530-1531). 
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47. Pauze's preliminary hearing was scheduled for Feb-
ruary 2, 1992. Baxter had been asked by the crown attorney or 
prosecutor in the matter to bring Nicholls to the crown attor-
ney's office to meet with her prior to court. When Nicholls and 
Baxter met with the crown attorney, Nicholls refused to discuss 
the matter with her and said that he would give his evidence 
under oath in court. (R. 1531). 
48. Nicholls, as the alleged victim, was the first 
witness called to testify at Pauze's preliminary hearing. (R. 
1299, 2477-2508, Exhibit D-ll). 
49. When Nicholls was questioned by the crown attor-
ney, he could not be sure that he had even purchased the subject 
Travelers Cheques. Nor could he be sure that he signed them. In 
fact, he could not even testify with certainty that he did not 
actually countersign and cash the Cheques. (R. 2477-2505, 
1305-1315, Exhibit 11-D). 
50. When Nicholls was cross-examined by Pauze's law-
yer, Mr. Morris, Nicholls testified that he had no recollection 
whatsoever of dealing with any of the Cheques that were exhibits 
before the court, that he did not know whether or not he pur-
chased them, that it could well have been that his signatures 
were not on any of the Cheques before the court. (R. 1315-1319, 
2505-2508, Exhibit 11-D). 
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51. Nicholls also testified at the preliminary hearing 
that Pauze was present in Nicholls, office on many occasions and 
would have had lots of opportunities to handle the Cheques that 
had been left in his desk. He testified that many times Pauze 
was left alone in his office when the Cheques were in his desk. 
(R. 1318-1319, 2505-2508). 
52. Faced with the inconsistent testimony of Nicholls, 
the supposed victim, the crown attorney voluntarily dismissed the 
charges against Pauze. (R. 1353, 2535-2536). 
53. Shortly after the charges against Pauze were dis-
missed, Pauze filed a $2 million malicious prosecution suit 
against American Express and the Metropolitan Toronto Police 
Department. (R. 1399, 708-720, Exhibit D-8). 
54. Because both Pauze and Nicholls then had lawsuits 
pending against American Express, they agreed to cooperate with 
each other in their respective lawsuits and to exchange documents 
and information. (R. 1327, 1393, 1409-1411). 
55. On June 23, 1992, Pauze accompanied Nicholls to 
Salt Lake City and attended the hearing on Nicholls7 first motion 
for summary judgment. During this hearing it was disclosed pub-
licly for the first time that Pauze's prints were found on both 
groups of Cheques — namely, those purchased on May 8 and those 
purchased on May 30. This was an important point because the 
exculpatory testimony given by Nicholls during Pauze7s 
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preliminary hearing did not account for the fact that Pauze's 
fingerprints were also found on the second group of Cheques. (R. 
1416-1418). 
56. On April 29, 1992, Pauze was deposed in Toronto. 
In his deposition, Pauze disclosed for the first time that while 
visiting Nicholls at Nicholls7 office in May, 1990, Pauze alleg-
edly handled two bundles of American Express Travelers Cheques 
from Nicholls' briefcase, and fingered through both of them in 
the presence of Nicholls and a third person by the name of Len 
Jones. As stated above, Len Jones was Nicholls' long-time insur-
ance agent and friend. (R. 1384, 1406-1409). 
57. However, Pauze failed to disclose that Mr. Jones 
or any other third party was present when he handled the Cheques 
at the time he was arrested by Baxter, or at the time he filed 
the malicious prosecution action against American Express and the 
Toronto police department. (R. 1398-1401, Exhibit D-8). 
58. Nicholls testified at trial that he did not recall 
the meeting with Pauze and Mr. Jones and did not remember Pauze 
seeing or handling the Cheques. (R. 1321-1323). 
59. Pauze7s lawyer, Mr. Morris, attended Nicholls7 
trial. Pauze, however, did not attend or testify at the trial. 
(R. 1315-1316). 
60. Four separate bank tellers, Elizabeth Joyce Job, 
Marija Griparic, Teresa Olivieri, and Flora Ballarin, testified 
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and positively identified Pauze as the man who cashed the Travel-
ers Cheques. (R, 1426-1481). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The findings of the district court should be 
upheld because Nicholls has failed to meet his burden of persua-
sion. He has failed to "marshal the evidence" in support of the 
findings and has failed to show that the findings are "clearly 
erroneous." Rather than marshaling the evidence in support of 
the court's findings, as required by Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure and discussed in Reid v. Mutual of Omaha 
Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 (Utah 1989), Nicholls has 
simply argued that the findings should be overturned. Moreover, 
he has failed to show how the court's findings are against the 
clear weight of the evidence. 
The findings should also be upheld because they are 
consistent with and supported by the evidence adduced at trial. 
The pivotal finding made by the district court was that Nicholls7 
Travelers Cheques were not lost or stolen. Ten separate reasons 
were given in support of this finding, including the fact that 
the court found Nicholls7 testimony to be neither credible nor 
plausible and the fact that Nicholls7 trial testimony on an 
important point was totally belied and refuted by a tape record-
ing of the subject telephone conversation. 
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2. The district court properly denied Nicholls' 
motions for summary judgment because of the existence of genuine 
issues of material facts — namely, whether the Cheques had been 
lost or stolen and whether Nicholls had received value from them. 
These factual issues turned on Nicholls' credibility and there-
fore were not appropriate for summary judgment. When both of 
Nicholls' motions for summary judgment were heard, there was sig-
nificant evidence presented to the court showing the discrepan-
cies and inconsistencies in Nicholls' testimony, causing his 
credibility to be in serious doubt. When the hearing on the 
first motion for summary judgment was held, American Express sub-
mitted evidence showing (1) Nicholls' suspicious handling of the 
Cheques, (2) the fact that Pauze's fingerprints were found on the 
Cheques, and (3) Nicholls' incredible testimony at Pauze's pre-
liminary hearing. Based on these arguments, the district court 
properly denied the motion. 
When the hearing on the second motion for summary judg-
ment was heard, American Express submitted not only the evidence 
from the first motion but also additional evidence from the depo-
sitions of Pauze, the five bank tellers who identified Pauze as 
having cashed the Cheques, Nicholls7 brother, Brad Nicholls, 
Nicholls' accountant who loaned him some of the money to buy the 
Cheques, Debbie Jones, and another bank investigator. Based on 
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this overwhelming evidence, the district court correctly denied 
the motion. 
3. The district court did not err in taxing costs 
against Nicholls. These costs included the deposition costs and 
the witness travel costs. The depositions taken by American 
Express were taken in good faith and were essential for the 
development and presentation of the case. All of the depositions 
were used in the various pretrial memoranda, and several of the 
depositions were read at trial. The travel costs for Baxter were 
appropriately taxed because he was not deposed and the costs for 
him to travel here and be a live witness at trial were less than 
or equal to what it would have cost to depose him. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
ENTERED BY THE DISTRICT COURT SHOULD BE 
UPHELD. 
The findings entered by the district court should stand 
because Nicholls has failed to "marshal the evidence" in support 
of his findings and has failed to show that the findings are 
"clearly erroneous." In addition, the findings are supported by 
and consistent with the evidence adduced at trial. In his brief, 
Nicholls essentially is asking this Court to reverse the lower 
court. By making this request, Nicholls appropriately bears a 
heavy burden of persuasion — one that he has not even attempted 
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to meet and cannot satisfy given the overwhelming evidence 
against him. 
A. Nicholls Not Only Has Failed To "Marshal The Evidence" 
In Support Of The Findings But Has Also Failed To Show 
That The Findings Are "Clearly Erroneous." 
As acknowledged by Nicholls in his brief, a party 
attempting to overturn findings of fact made by a trial court 
must meet an extremely heavy burden of persuasion. Rule 52(a) of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure sets forth the applicable stan-
dard as follows: 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the 
trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses. 
Thus, to set aside findings entered by a court, one not only must 
prove that the findings are "clearly erroneous," but must do so 
by giving "due regard" to the opportunity of the trial court to 
judge the credibility of the witnesses. In Henderson v. For-Shor 
Co., 757 P.2d 465, 473 (Utah App. 1988), the court stated that 
application of the "clearly erroneous" standard in Rule 52(a) 
does not eliminate the deference traditionally accorded the 
factfinder to determine the credibility of the witnesses. 
This Court has described the party's burden of meeting 
this "clearly erroneous" standard as follows: 
To mount a successful challenge to the cor-
rectness of a trial court's finding of fact, 
an appellant must first marshal all of the 
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evidence supporting the finding and then dem-
onstrate that the evidence is legally insuf-
ficient to support the finding even in view-
ing it in the light most favorable to the 
court below. . . . A finding attacked as 
lacking adequate evidentiary support is 
deemed "clearly erroneous" only if we con-
clude that the finding is against the clear 
weight of the evidence. 
Reid v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co., 776 P.2d 896, 899-900 
(Utah 1989). 
To overturn the district court7s findings, Nicholls 
must marshal the evidence supporting the findings and must then 
show that the district court's findings are "so lacking in sup-
port as to be against the clear weight of the evidence." More-
over, the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to 
American Express. Id* See also, In re Bartell, 776 P. 2d 885, 
886 (Utah 1989)(quoting State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 
1987); State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 786 (Utah 1988)(quoting 
State v. Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987) (when reviewing a 
bench trial for sufficiency of evidence, we must sustain the 
trial court's judgment unless it is against the clear weight of 
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise reaches a defi-
nite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.) 
Nicholls has failed to meet his burden of persuasion. 
He has marshaled little, if any, evidence in support of the dis-
trict court's findings. Instead, he has simply argued why the 
findings generally should be overturned. Most importantly, he 
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has failed to show how the court's findings are against the clear 
weight of the evidence. Since Nicholls has failed to meet his 
burden of persuasion, the district court's findings should stand. 
B. The Findings Of Fact And Conclusions Of Law Entered By 
The District Court Are Consistent With And Supported By 
The Evidence Adduced At Trial. 
The pivotal finding in this case is set forth in Para-
graph 3 of the district court's written findings wherein the 
court expressly found that the "subject Travelers Cheques were 
not lost or stolen." (R. 1034, Addendum 1). As demonstrated 
below, this finding is overwhelmingly supported by the evidence 
adduced at trial. Indeed, Paragraph 3 of the written findings 
sets forth ten separate reasons supporting the finding. American 
Express will not burden the Court by reiterating all of the 
evidence presented during the two-day bench trial, but instead 
will invite the Court's attention to the summary of evidence set 
forth in American Express' closing argument. (R. 1586-1606). 
For illustrative purposes, American Express will examine four of 
the key reasons given by the district court in support of its 
finding and demonstrate that each is amply supported by the 
evidence. 
1. Paragraph 3(a) of the Written Findings 
Paragraph 3(a) states: 
This case turns on the credibility of 
Nicholls, and the Court finds that Nicholls' 
testimony was neither credible nor plausible. 
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It is well established that it is the exclusive prov-
ince of the factfinder to judge the credibility of the respective 
trial witnesses. See State v. Bacrley, 681 P.2d 1242, 1244 (Utah 
1984)("It is not our [the appellate court's] function to deter-
mine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the reasonable 
inferences to be drawn therefrom"); State v. Reed, 198 Utah Adv. 
Rpt. 56 (Ut. App. 1992)("Because the trial court had the opportu-
nity to view these witnesses and weigh their credibility, we 
defer to its findings unless the record demonstrates clear error. 
This appellate approach is consistent with the supreme court's 
directive that it is not the function of appellate courts 'to 
determine the credibility of conflicting evidence or the reason-
able inferences to be drawn therefrom.'" (citations omitted)) In 
this case the district court did just that. The court listened 
to the testimony of Nicholls and the other witnesses and also 
observed their respective demeanors while testifying. After hav-
ing done so, the court found that Nicholls' testimony was not 
credible or plausible. Simply put, the court found that Nicholls 
was not telling the truth. 
2. Paragraph 3(b) of the Written Findings 
Paragraph 3(b) states: 
In particular, it is not credible or believ-
able that, after purchasing the second batch 
of Travelers Cheques at the American Express 
office in Toronto, Canada on May 30, 1990 and 
placing them into a briefcase already con-
taining the first batch of Travelers Cheques 
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purchased on May 8, 1990, Nicholls would 
leave the briefcase unattended in the trunk 
of his car until he arrived at the airport on 
June 3, 1990, would then hand-carry the 
briefcase onto an airplane and travel to Swe-
den for the purpose of attending the equip-
ment auction, would then attend the auction 
and actually bid on several pieces of equip-
ment (although never having the high bid on 
any piece of equipment), and would then 
return home without at least once opening the 
briefcase to verify that it still contained 
his Travelers Cheques. 
The specific facts concerning Nicholls' supposed han-
dling of the Cheques are set forth in detail in the foregoing 
Statement of Facts. The details are entirely consistent with the 
above finding and are not being challenged. What is being chal-
lenged is the court's finding that Nicholls' testimony regarding 
his handling of the Cheques was not credible or believable. Com-
mon sense provides ample support for this finding. It simply 
defies common sense to assume that one would purchase $99,000 
worth of Travelers Cheques for use on an important overseas buy-
ing trip, leave the Cheques unattended in a briefcase in the 
trunk of a car for five days, hand-carry the briefcase onto an 
airplane for a flight from Toronto to Sweden, attend an auction 
with the briefcase in hand and bid on several pieces of expensive 
equipment, and then return home without at least opening the 
briefcase to verify the presence of the Cheques. Obviously, the 
longer it took Nicholls to "discover the missing Cheques," the 
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more time Nicholls' accomplices would have to cash the Cheques 
before the authorities could be alerted. 
3. Paragraph 3(c) Of The Written Findings. 
Paragraph 3(c) states: 
Nicholls testified that he had a telephone 
conversation with Detective Peter Baxter of 
the Metropolitan Toronto Police Department on 
October 23, 1991 wherein, according to 
Nicholls, Detective Baxter screamed at him, 
threatened him, and demanded he sign the 
"will say" statement, when in fact, as demon-
strated by the tape recording of this conver-
sation (Exhibit 19-D), Detective Baxter did 
none of these things. 
As the record clearly demonstrates, Nicholls testified 
at trial that during a telephone conversation with Baxter, Baxter 
screamed at him, threatened him, and demanded he sign the 
will-say statement. In Volume 1, page 151 (R. 1344), Nicholls' 
counsel, Mr. Anderson, was questioning Nicholls about his conver-
sation with Baxter. The trial transcript states: 
Q (Mr. Anderson) You suggested to Mr. Coun-
sel (Mr. Roche) a while ago that Mr. Baxter 
attempted to threaten you. Did he threaten 
you on the telephone or did he threaten you in 
person? 
A (Mr. Nicholls) He threatened me on the 
telephone and told me if I didn't sign the 
statement that he was going to make sure I 
didn't get my money back on my Utah lawsuit. 
Nicholls' testimony was consistent when American Express' coun-
sel, Mr. Roche, was questioning Nicholls about that same 
conversation. On pages 172 and 173 (R. 1365-1366) of that trial 
transcript, it states: 
Q (Mr. Roche) And Mr. Baxter repeatedly 
asked you, did he not, to identify what parts 
of this statement that you claim were mislead-
ing, inaccurate or does not tell the whole 
story, correct? 
A (Mr. Nicholls) At that time Mr. Baxter 
called me back, the tone and the voice of the 
conversation was in a screaming match on the 
telephone and I wasn't prepared to argue or 
scream at Mr. Baxter. And I didn't want to 
have any more part of the conversation and, 
please, give me the subpoena. 
Q (Mr. Roche) You are denying that he 
repeatedly asked you to identify what parts of 
the statement were inaccurate? 
A (Mr. Nicholls) I am not denying that, 
sir. But he was screaming. I was having dif-
ficulty paying attention to everything that he 
said. 
However, when Baxter was questioned about his conversa-
tion with Nicholls, his response was much different than 
Nicholls'. In Volume II, pages 153-154 (R. 1524-1525), Mr. Roche 
questioned Baxter about his conversation with Nicholls: 
Q (Mr. Roche) Did you have a telephone con-
versation with Mr. Nicholls following the 
receipt of this document? 
A (Mr. Baxter) Yes. Just a few moments 
after this document was received and in 
response to his phone message, I called him. 
Q Did you tape record the conversation? 
A I did. 
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Q Why? 
A Two reasons: one, the most unusual letter 
that I had just received, this exhibit. The 
letter indicates that there were problems with 
this will-say statement which I sent to him. 
It refers to a letter from me demanding him to 
sign it, and I didn't ask him to sign it. It 
was a most unusual letter that I felt I wanted 
a permanent record of the conversation, plus 
allow my partner to be able to review with me 
what Mr. Nicholls said and that was the only 
way I was able to do it. 
Mr. Roche: Mr. Anderson, this is what we have 
marked as Exhibit 18-D. It is the same tran-
script that we delivered to your office this 
morning. 
The court heard the conflicting testimony of Nicholls 
and Baxter about the telephone conversation. It then heard the 
tape and read the transcript of the tape. Based on this evi-
dence, the court found that the tape and the transcript supported 
Baxter's testimony, not Nicholls7 testimony. Both the tape and 
the transcript of the tape proved that Baxter did not scream at 
Nicholls, threaten him, or demand that he sign the will-say 
statement. In other words, Nicholls was caught lying on an 
important point. 
4. Paragraph 3(i) Of The Written Findings. 
Paragraph 3(i) states: 
At the preliminary hearing in Pauze's criminal 
proceeding, held on February 3, 1992, Nicholls 
did not act or testify in a manner consistent 
with him being a victim of a serious crime; he 
refused the prosecutor's request that he 
review his testimony with her prior to the 
hearing, and during the hearing he could not 
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even remember whether he actually purchased 
the subject Travelers Cheques or be certain 
that he did not countersign the Travelers 
Cheques; 
The evidence supports this finding because it shows 
that Nicholls failed to cooperate with the prosecutor prior to 
the preliminary hearing. Mr. Roche questioned Baxter about 
Nicholls7 meeting with the prosecutor on the morning of the pre-
liminary hearing. On page 160 (R. 153 0), Volume II of the tran-
script , it states: 
Q (Mr. Roche) Let's now move to February 2, 
1992, the day of Mr. Pauze's preliminary hear-
ing. Did you meet with Mr. Nicholls prior to 
the hearing? 
A (Mr. Baxter) Yes, I had been asked by the 
Crown Attorney in this matter to bring Mr. 
Nicholls to the Crown Attorney7s Office to 
meet with her prior to court as soon as he 
entered the building. When I saw him in the 
hallway, I asked him if he would accompany me 
to the second floor of the Crown Attorney's 
Office and he did so. He and I entered the 
doorway of the Crown Attorney's Office and I 
introduced him to her and she asked him if he 
would discuss the matter with her and he 
refused to speak to her regarding the matter. 
He said he would give his evidence under oath 
in court and he wasn't prepared to speak with 
her at that time. 
Nicholls was called to testify because, ironically, he 
was the alleged victim. However, his testimony illustrated that 
he was anything but a victim. He did not act or testify in a 
manner consistent with him being a victim of a serious crime 
because during the preliminary hearing he could not even remember 
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whether he actually purchased the subject Travelers Cheques or be 
certain that he did not countersign the Travelers Cheques. Prob-
ably the most poignant testimony during the preliminary hearing 
occurred when Mr. Morris, Pauze's attorney at the preliminary 
hearing, cross-examined Nicholls. It was beautifully orches-
trated between Nicholls and Pauze's lawyer, Mr. Morris. In Vol-
ume I of the transcript, pages 122-124 (R. 1315-1317), Mr. Roche 
was questioning Nicholls about this portion of Nicholls' testi-
mony at the preliminary hearing: 
Q (Mr. Roche) Let's go down to the bottom of 
that page where it says, "Cross-examination by 
Mr. Morris." Are you with me there? 
A (Mr. Nicholls) Yes, the bottom of 32? 
Q Uh-huh. And who is Mr. Morris? 
A I believe Mr. Pauze's lawyer. 
Q And he is sitting in the courtroom today, 
is he not? 
A Yes. 
Q And Mr. Morris asked you this, the very 
first question of Mr. Morris was this, was it 
not? "If I understand you correctly, sir, and 
correct me if I am wrong, you have no recol-
lection whatsoever of dealing with any of the 
Cheques that are exhibits before this Court; 
is that not correct?" And your answer, sir? 
A "That is correct." 
Q The prosecutor says, "I am sorry, I didn't 
hear that question." Mr. Morris then says, 
"He does not know whether he purchased them or 
not. You don't know whether or not any 
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signatures on those Cheques are yours or not; 
is that correct?" And your answer, sir? 
A "I am not certain." 
Q Next question, "It may well be that your 
signature is not on any of those Cheques, on 
those exhibits before the Court, is that not a 
fact?" And your answer? 
A "Yes." 
Q "Now, Mr. Pauze is a gentleman known to 
you for many years?" And your answer? 
A "Yes." 
Q "He was in your presence often?" Your 
answer? 
A "Yes." 
Nicholls had a selective memory that was directed at 
helping which ever cause was in his best interest, regardless of 
the truth. His testimony at the preliminary hearing directly 
conflicted with his testimony in his affidavit, in his deposi-
tion, and at trial. These conflicts suggest he was attempting to 
defraud American Express and exonerate his friend Pauze. They 
seriously undermined his credibility. 
Like the examples given above, all of the findings of 
fact and conclusions of law are supported by the evidence adduced 
at trial. As indicated by the district court on several 
1
 Paragraphs 1, 2, 3(d), and 3(e) of the findings of fact 
entered by the Court were stipulated to by the parties in the 
Pre-Trial Order (R. 653-673). 
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occasions, this case turned on credibility. See Transcript of 
Trial, Volume 3, p. 38 (R. 1615). For two days the court had an 
opportunity to judge the credibility of the various witnesses, 
and most importantly the credibility of Nicholls. In the court's 
judgment, Nicholls lacked credibility and it ruled against him. 
Since Nicholls has failed even to attempt to meet the 
"clearly erroneous" standard and since the findings and conclu-
sions are overwhelmingly supported by the evidence at trial, 
American Express respectfully requests that the findings and con-
clusions be upheld. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DENIED NICHOLLS' 
MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BECAUSE HIS 
CREDIBILITY WAS AT ISSUE AND BECAUSE DISCREP-
ANCIES AND INCONSISTENCIES EXISTED IN HIS 
TESTIMONY ABOUT WHETHER THE CHEQUES WERE LOST 
OR STOLEN. 
It is well established that when considering a motion 
for summary judgment, the court must consider the evidence in the 
light most favorable to the non-moving party and give the 
non-moving party the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from the evidence before the court. Wineqar v. Froerer 
Corp., 813 P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991); Brigqs v. Holcomb, 740 P.2d 
281, 283 (Utah App. 1987). Nicholls' motions for summary judg-
ment raised significant issues of fact about whether the Cheques 
were lost or stolen and whether he received value from them. 
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These factual issues turned on Nicholls' credibility and there-
fore were not appropriate for summary judgment. 
A. When A Motion For Summary Judgment Involves 
Issues Which Turn On Credibility, The Motion 
Should Be Denied. 
Summary judgment is not proper when a material issue 
turns on one's credibility. In Madison v. Deseret Livestock Co., 
574 F.2d 1027 (10th Cir. 1978), the Tenth Circuit reversed a sum-
mary judgment entered by the district court because credibility 
was at issue and because conflicting inferences could be drawn 
from the affidavits and depositions on record. In Madison, the 
factual issue was whether employees of Deseret had knowledge of a 
dangerous condition on the property prior to the accident. Vari-
ous depositions were taken and affidavits filed in support of and 
in opposition to a motion for summary judgment. The court 
stated: 
Affidavits are not a substitute for trial and 
summary judgment is not proper where an issue 
turns on credibility. Summary judgment should 
not be granted where different inferences can 
be drawn from conflicting affidavits and dep-
ositions. (Citations omitted). 
Id. at 1036. See also Baum v. Gillman, 648 F.2d 1292, 1295-96 
(10th Cir. 1981)("Any action when examined under Rule 56 which 
raises real issues about credibility, motive, or intent is not 
suitable [for summary judgment] whatever the nature of the cause 
may be."); Eagle v. Louisiana Southern Life Insurance Co. , 464 
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F.2d 607, 608 (10th Cir. 1972) ("Summary judgment is not proper 
when an issue turns on credibility"); Romero v. Union Pacific 
Railroad, 615 F.2d 1303, 1309 (10th Cir. 1980)("Summary judgment 
should not be granted where different inferences can be drawn 
from conflicting affidavits and depositions. This is particu-
larly so when an issue turns on credibility."); National Aviation 
Underwriters, Inc. v. Altus Flying Services, Inc., 555 F.2d 778, 
784 (10th Cir. 1977) ("Affidavits are not a substitute for trial 
and summary judgment is improper where an issue turns on credi-
bility as it did here."); Little Red House v. Qualify Ford Sales, 
Inc., 511 F.2d 230, 234 (10th Cir. 1975)(Summary judgment is not 
properly awarded when an issue turns on credibility); and Cordova 
v. Gosar, 719 P.2d 625, 639 (Wyo. 1986) ("When credibility is to 
be tested, the witnesses should testify at trial.") 
B, When Both Of Nicholls/ Motions For Summary 
Judgment Were Heard, There Was Overwhelming 
Evidence Presented To The District Court 
Showing The Discrepancies And Inconsistencies 
In Nicholls7 Testimony, Thereby Creating 
Issues Of Fact And Causing His Credibility To 
Be Placed In Serious Doubt. 
Nicholls' first motion for summary judgment was filed 
on September 19, 1990, just 15 days after American Express 
answered the Complaint. (R 28, 66). At the time that motion was 
filed, American Express' security officer in Toronto, Mr. Barr, 
had investigated the claim, but no formal discovery had been com-
menced. Barr's investigation to that point had included meeting 
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with Nicholls and his attorney to hear his questionable story of 
how he had handled the Cheques, visiting all 22 locations where 
the Cheques had been cashed, interviewing many of the bank 
tellers who had cashed the Cheques, and speaking with other bank 
officers who had dealt with Nicholls. (R. 109-115, 1224-1228, 
1230-1235)• Barr was extremely suspicious of Nicholls' claim and 
believed the claim was fraudulent. (R. 658, 1235). 
Without having conducted any discovery, American 
Express filed a memorandum arguing that the motion should be 
denied because the case involved material issues of fact that 
turned on Nicholls7 credibility or, in the alternative, the 
motion was premature and should be continued to allow time for 
discovery. In support of the memorandum, American Express filed 
two Rule 56(f) affidavits, one of Mark S. Webber, counsel for 
American Express, and the other of Barr. The Webber affidavit 
simply stated that based upon American Express7 investigation it 
was suspicious of the claim and requested an additional three 
months to complete its investigation (R. 83-106). The Barr affi-
davit set forth what he had learned in his investigation of 
Nicholls and Nicholls' questionable claim. Barr stated that he 
was suspicious of Nicholls7 claim and believed it to be fraudu-
lent. (R. 109-115). Based upon American Express7 response, 
Nicholls agreed to postpone the hearing indefinitely until some 
discovery was performed. 
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In the meantime, the investigation continued and dis-
covery commenced. Barr filed a report with the Toronto police; 
Nicholls/ deposition was taken in November, 1990; and counsel 
exchanged written discovery. On March 11, 1991, the Toronto 
police identified the prints of Pauze on the Cheques. 
2 
(R. 1501-1502) . On July 24, 1991, Pauze was arrested and 
charged with fraud, possession of property obtained by crime, and 
uttering a forged document. (R. 1517-1519). On February 2, 
1992, Pauze's preliminary hearing was held and, based on 
Nicholls' conveniently weak testimony, the charges against Pauze 
were dropped. (R. 1353, 2535-2536). Since the charges had been 
dropped against Pauze and the Toronto investigation was finished, 
the district court in Utah set the hearing on Nicholls' motion 
for summary judgment for March 9, 1992. 
Prior to the hearing, American Express filed a supple-
mental memorandum accompanied by a supplemental affidavit of Barr 
and an affidavit of Gordon W. Myers, the Toronto police finger-
print technician who examined the Cheques and found the prints of 
Pauze. Attached as an exhibit to the memorandum was the 
2
 The name Paul Pauze first came to light in this case at 
Nicholls' deposition when he was describing the circumstances of 
some of the significant insurance claims he had made. One such 
claim was for $85,000 and resulted from a fire on his boat. When 
asked who was with him at the time of the fire, Nicholls men-
tioned Pauze, who he said had been and currently was a friend of 
his. (R. 2443-2444). 
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transcript of Pauze's preliminary hearing which showed Nicholls' 
inconsistent and contrived testimony. American Express argued in 
its brief that three points demonstrated the existence of a genu-
ine dispute as to whether the Cheques were lost or stolen: 
(1) Nicholls' suspicious handling of the Cheques, (2) the fact 
that Nicholls' close friend and business associate's fingerprints 
were found on the Cheques, and (3) Nicholls' incredible testimony 
at Pauze's preliminary hearing. It argued that the resolution of 
this key factual issue turned on Nicholls' credibility, which had 
been seriously called into question, and that therefore the 
motion for summary judgment should be denied. The district court 
agreed and denied the motion and set the case for trial. 
In May 1992, American Express7 counsel travelled to 
Toronto and took nine depositions, including the five bank tell-
ers who had identified Pauze as having cashed the Cheques, the 
fingerprint technician named Gordon Myers, Pauze, Nicholls' 
brother and work associate, Brad Nicholls, Nicholls' accountant 
who had loaned him some money to buy the Cheques, Debbie Jones, 
and a security officer from another Toronto bank who had had 
prior dealings with Nicholls. Also, Nicholls took the deposition 
of Barr in Toronto. 
On June 10, 1992, Nicholls filed another motion for 
summary judgment, arguing that Nicholls' credibility should not 
be an issue in a motion for summary judgment. American Express 
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filed a responsive memorandum arguing that, in addition to the 
arguments set forth in its supplemental memorandum in opposition 
to Nicholls7 first motion for summary judgment, the deposition 
testimony of Pauze, Brad Nicholls, Debbie Jones and the five bank 
tellers provided additional support for the fact that a genuine 
issue of fact existed as to whether the Travelers Cheques were 
lost or stolen, as Nicholls was alleging. The district court 
denied Nicholls7 motion on June 23, 1992. 
Both of Nicholls7 motions for summary judgment were 
properly denied by the court. In each instance there was over-
whelming evidence before the court that showed Nicholls7 incon-
sistent testimony was incredible and created issues of fact about 
whether the Cheques were lost or stolen or whether Nicholls 
received value for them. This evidence placed Nicholls7 credi-
bility in serious doubt and strongly suggested he was attempting 
to defraud American Express. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT CORRECTLY TAXED COSTS 
AGAINST NICHOLLS. 
After the district court rendered a decision in favor 
of American Express and against Nicholls, American Express filed 
a motion, pursuant to Rule 54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, to tax certain costs against Nicholls. Nicholls objected 
to literally every cost that American Express itemized in its 
Bill of Costs. (R. 928-942). After a hearing on the motion, the 
-39-
district court granted American Express' motion and taxed the 
itemized costs against Nicholls. American Express is entitled to 
all of the costs itemized therein. 
A. Depositions. 
The district court has the discretion to tax deposition 
costs if it finds that they were reasonably necessary. In 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated: 
[A] majority of this Court has approved the 
taxing as costs the taking of depositions, 
but subject to the limitation that the trial 
court is persuaded that they were taken in 
good faith and, in the light of the circum-
stances, appeared to be essential for the 
development and presentation of the case. 
Id. at 774. Thus, the allowance of the costs of depositions is 
within the sound discretion of the district court. See also 
Lloyds Unlimited v. Nature's Way Marketing, Ltd., 753 P.2d 507, 
512 (Utah Ct. App. 1988)(whether costs should be awarded is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court). 
The depositions taken by American Express were taken in 
good faith and were essential for the development and presenta-
tion of the case. Nicholls was the party who chose to bring this 
lawsuit in Utah where absolutely none of the witnesses resided. 
American Express had to travel to Toronto, Canada, to take the 
depositions of non-party witnesses. Since literally all of the 
witnesses resided outside of the country and therefore outside of 
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the subpoena power of the court, methods of discovery other than 
by deposition were impossible. All of the depositions taken by 
American Express in Toronto were used and cited in various pre-
trial memoranda, and several of the depositions were read at 
trial. Contrary to Nicholls' assertions, it would have been 
unreasonable for American Express not to take these depositions. 
Accordingly, American Express' costs for these depositions were 
properly taxed against Nicholls, and the district court's deci-
sion should be affirmed. 
B. Witness Travel Costs and Expenses. 
American Express is entitled to recover its costs for 
3 the travel expenses of Detective Peter Baxter to attend trial. 
Detective Baxter was a key witness who was not hostile toward 
American Express. American Express concedes that Detective 
Baxter was not subpoenaed; the Utah district court did not have 
subpoena power over a police officer in a foreign country. The 
Toronto police department was willing to make Baxter available 
3
 In his Brief, at p. 31, Nicholls asserts that it was 
improper for American Express to obtain the costs of Jane Egan. 
However, a careful analysis of American Express' Bill of Costs 
indicates that American Express did not request and was not 
awarded the costs associated with her. Baxter and Ms. Egan 
stayed at the Red Lion Hotel. The bill for their rooms was 
$906.15. That was divided by two, equalling $453.08 for each. 
The additional $500.00 paid to Detective Baxter was for his 
travel and meals. The hotel bill of $453.08 plus the $500.00 
travel and meals expense equals the $953.08 set forth in American 
Express' Bill of Costs. 
-41-
and Baxter himself was willing to be available to testify at 
trial so long as his travel costs and expenses were paid. The 
travel costs and expenses were reasonable and necessary for him 
to testify at trial. 
In his Brief, Nicholls objected to the court taxing 
costs for Baxter's travel and expenses to come to Utah. Appel-
late 's Brief at p. 31. He implies that Baxter's deposition 
should have been taken in Toronto. However, based upon the fact 
that Nicholls objected to the costs of every deposition taken in 
Toronto, the same objection would undoubtedly have been asserted. 
Even if Baxter's deposition would have been taken in Toronto, the 
costs for that deposition would likely have been as much, if not 
more than, the costs incurred as a result of Baxter being present 
at trial. Baxter was a key witness because he was the chief 
investigating officer in the case involving Nicholls and Pauze. 
His deposition would likely have taken at least a day and maybe 
longer. Based upon the charge of $972.00 for the transcript of 
the deposition of Pauze, it is likely and almost certain that a 
transcript of a deposition taken of Baxter would have cost in 
excess of the $953.08 that American Express sought for Baxter's 
travel expenses. Not only are the costs for Baxter to travel to 
Salt Lake less than the costs that likely would have been 
incurred to take his deposition in Toronto, the district court 
had the benefit of a live witness at trial. In short, the costs 
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sought for Baxter were less than what the costs would have been 
if American Express had taken his deposition in Toronto and were 
reasonable and necessary under the circumstances. Therefore, the 
Court should affirm the district court's decision to tax Baxter's 
travel expenses against Nicholls. 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and conclusions entered by the district 
court should be upheld and the court's judgment should be 
affirmed. They are consistent with and supported by the evidence 
adduced at trial. The district court's denial of Nicholls' 
motions for summary judgment should be affirmed. There was over-
whelming evidence before the court showing issues of fact as to 
whether the Cheques were lost or stolen or whether Nicholls 
received value for them. These issues turned on Nicholls' credi-
bility and therefore were not appropriate for summary judgment. 
The district court's decision to tax costs against Nicholls 
should be affirmed. The costs were reasonable and necessary 
under the circumstances. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
KEITH E. TAYLOR (3201) 
KENT 0. ROCHE (2783) 
MARK S. WEBBER (4940) 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
201 South State Street, Suite 1800 
P.O. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
RICHARD DOUGLAS (DOUG) ) 
NICHOLLS, ) FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
) CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, ) 
vs. ) 
AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL ) Civil No. 900904706CN 
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY, ) 
INC., a New York corporation, ) Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. ) 
* * * * * * * * 
This case was tried to the Court sitting without a jury 
on July 7, 8, and 14, 1992. Plaintiff Richard Douglas (Doug) 
Nicholls ("NiclioHs") was represented by Walker E. Anderson and 
by Robert J. Fenn and Colin G. James of Dubernet, Stewart & Fenn. 
Defendant American Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. 
("American Express") was represented by Kent O. Roche and Mark S. 
Webber of Parsons Behle & Latimer. 
The Court, having now heard the evidence presented by 
the parties at trial, having judged the credibility of the 
*Ksssr-
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witnesses, and being fully advised in the premises, hereby enters 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Nicholls purchased a total of $99,000.00 (U.S.) in 
American Express Travelers Cheques. He purchased $17,000.00 
(U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 8# 1990 and purchased the 
remaining $82,000.00 (U.S.) of Travelers Cheques on May 30, 1990. 
2. On June 8, 1990, Nicholls reported to American 
Express that the subject Travelers Cheques had been lost or sto-
len. After American Express refused his demand that it issue 
replacement cheques or refund his money, Nicholls commenced this 
action, asserting claims for breach of contract, mental anguish 
and distress, negligence and reckless indifference, conversion, 
and constructive fraud. 
3. The subject Travelers Cheques were not lost or 
stolen. This finding is based upon all the evidence adduced at 
trial, including, but not limited to, the following: 
(a) This case turns on the credibility of 
Nicholls, and the Court finds that Nicholls' testimony was nei-
ther credible nor plausible; 
(b) In particular, it is not credible or believ-
able that, after purchasing the second batch of Travelers Cheques 
at the American Express office in Toronto, Canada on May 30, 1990 
and placing them into a briefcase already containing the first 
batch of Travelers Cheques purchased on May 8, 1990, Nicholls 
would leave the briefcase unattended in the trunk of his car 
until he arrived at the airport on June 3, 1990, would then 
hand-carry the briefcase onto an airplane and travel to Sweden 
for the purpose of attending the equipment auction, would then 
attend the auction and actually bid on several pieces of equip-
ment (although never having the high bid on any piece of equip-
ment) , and would then return home without at least once opening 
the briefcase to verify that it still contained his Travelers 
Cheques; 
(c) Nicholls testified that he had a telephone 
conversation with Detective Peter Baxter of the Metropolitan 
Toronto Police Department on October 23, 1991 wherein, according 
to Nicholls, Detective Baxter screamed at him, threatened him, 
and demanded he sign the "will say" statement, when in fact, as 
demonstrated by the tape recording of this conversation (Exhibit 
19-D), Detective Baxter did none of these things; 
(d) A total of $87,000.00 of the subject Travel-
ers Cheques were cashed at 23 different locations in the Toronto 
area during the period of May 31, 1990 through June 7, 1990; 
(e) The fingerprints of Paul Louis Pauze 
("Pauze") were found on 12 of the subject Travelers Cheques; the 
12 cheques containing Pauze's fingerprints included cheques from 
both the first batch purchased on May 8, 1990 and the second 
batch purchased on May 30, 1990; 
(f) Pauze was also identified by four separate 
bank tellers as the person who cashed certain of the subject 
Travelers Cheques; 
(g) Pauze was arrested by the Metropolitan 
Toronto Police Department on July 24, 1991 and charged with 
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unlawfully defrauding Nicholls by cashing a quantity of the sub-
ject Travelers Cheques and related crimes; Detective Baxter made 
the arrest after Nicholls confirmed to him that, to his knowl-
edge, no one saw or handled the subject Travelers Cheques from 
the time Nicholls left the American Express office on the after-
noon of May 30, 1990; when arrested, Pauze informed Detective 
Baxter that he had handled the Travelers Cheques while in 
Nicholls' office; Pauze asserted to Detective Baxter that 
Nicholls could verify this point, but did not disclose at this 
time that a second individual, a Mr. Len Jones, was also suppos-
edly present and could verify this point as well; 
(h) Pauze has been a close personal friend and 
business associate of Nicholls for ten years; 
(i) At the preliminary hearing in Pauze's crimi-
nal proceeding, held on February 3, 1992, Nicholls did not act or 
testify in a manner consistent with him being a victim of a seri-
ous crime; he refused the prosecutor's request that he review his 
testimony with her prior to the hearing, and during the hearing 
he could not even remember whether he actually purchased the sub-
ject Travelers Cheques or be certain that he did not countersign 
the Travelers Cheques; and 
(j) In light of the foregoing and all the other 
evidence adduced at trial, there is a very strong suspicion of 
conspiracy among Nicholls, Pauze, and perhaps even Mr. Len Jones 
and Mr. Brad Nicholls. 
4. The Court further finds that this action was 
brought by Nicholls in bad faith in an attempt to defraud 
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American Express. Nevertheless, the Court does not find that 
Nicholls' action was "without merit" within the meaning of Utah 
Code Ann, S 78-27-56 and therefore denies American Express' 
request for attorneys1 fees. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court has jurisdiction over this action and 
the parties, and venue is also proper. 
2. American Express did not breach the purchase 
agreements entered into at the time Nicholls purchased the sub-
ject Travelers Cheques, nor did American Express engage in any 
tortious conduct against Nicholls. 
3. American Express is not entitled to recover its 
attorneys' fees pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56. 
4. Judgment shall forthwith be entered in this action 
in favor of American Express and against Nicholls. The judgment 
shall dismiss this action and each and every claim asserted by 
Nicholls on the merits and shall furthermore award American 
Express its taxable costs as allowed by law. 
ENqpSRE&^hnr^r^^ gay or August, 1932. 
1P3T 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing proposed FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
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1992: 
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AMERICAN EXPRESS TRAVEL 
RELATED SERVICES COMPANY, 
INC., a New York corporation, 
Defendant. 
* * * * * * * * 
This action came on for trial before the Court, Honor-
able Anne M. Stirba, District Court Judge, presiding, and the 
issues having been duly tried, and the Court having entered Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that plaintiff Rich-
ard Douglas (Doug) Nicholls ("Nicholls") take nothing, that this 
action, including each and every claim asserted by Nicholls, be 
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dismissed with prejudice on the merits, and that defendant Ameri-
can Express Travel Related Services Company, Inc. recover from 
Nicholls its taxable costs in the amount of 
D^ IED-jthis crffi^ xday of Auguct7 1992. 
^•£vV£-
BY THE COJJR' 
ANN! 
DISTRlCT^gOURT JUDGE 
~^>«kA ^U. "*Ulr <^y 
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TRANSCRIPT OF DISTRICT COURT'S RULING 
TtraSDAY, JULY 14, 1992 9;3Q A,M, 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: All right, thank you. That 
concludes closing arguments in this case. I have worked 
on this case over the weekend. I've prepared my ruling 
and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law based upon my 
review of the evidence and the evidence I heard at trial. 
I listened to closing arguments with an open mind to see 
if there is something that would change my opinion about 
that and I can say that because I don't want you to come 
away with the feeling that your arguments were 
meaningless because they were not. They were helpful to 
me. 
I would like to start by complimenting all 
counsel in this case. It has been a pleasure to preside 
over the case. The evidence has been presented 
interestingly, thoroughly and succinctly and I appreciate 
all of that. 
I am first going to go over what the claims are 
of the parties. First of all, the plaintiff claims 
breach of contract by the defendant. That the plaintiff 
paid $99,000 to the defendant to purchase travelers 
cheques in May of 1990. The purchase agreement that was 
entered into provides for a refund or replacement of the 
$99,000 in the event the cheques are lost or stolen. Now 
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the plaintiff claims that they were lost or stolen. 
Plaintiff also claims that the defendant has refused to 
refund or replace the cheques and is seeking judgment for 
$99,000, plus 10 percent prejudgment interest, plus 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. The plaintiff also 
seeks damages based upon a claim of mental anguish and 
distress claiming judgment for $10 nominal damages, 
$99,000 actual damages and $50,000 general damages, plus 
reasonable attorney's fees and costs. 
The plaintiff also seeks damages for alleged 
negligence and reckless indifference by the defendant in 
the defendant's refusal to refund or replace the 
travelers cheques. The plaintiff also seeks damages for 
alleged wrongful conversion and for constructive fraud 
and the damages associated with those claims. 
The defendant claims that the $99,000 in 
travelers cheques were neither lost nor stolen, and that 
the plaintiff is therefore not entitled to obtain a 
judgment against it or on any of its theories of 
liability. The defendant claims that although the 
plaintiff may not have actually cashed the cheques 
himself, that the plaintiff received value for the 
cheques and conspired with others to cash the cheques. 
The defendant claims that the plaintiff is attempting to 
defraud the defendant by asserting a refund claim. The 
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1 I defendant also contends that it is entitled to recover 
2 I its attorney's fees and costs pursuant to Section 78-27-
3 J 56 and the cases cited today as a result of plaintiff's 
4 J allegedly bad faith claims. 
5 J The Court finds that it has jurisdiction over 
6 the parties, the subject matter of this lawsuit and all 
7 claims, and that venue is also proper. This case, in my 
8 I judgment, does turn on the credibility of Mr. Nicholls, 
9 the plaintiff, and the following are the Court's Findings 
10 of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
11 On May 8, 1990, the plaintiff purchased 
12 J $17,000, U.S. currency, in American Travelers Cheques, 
13 J from the bank of Nova Scotia in Woodbridge, Ontario, 
14 Canada. The cheques are identified as indicated on page 
15 five of the Final Pretrial Order. 
16 On May 30, the plaintiff purchased $82,000, 
17 I U.S. currency, in American Express Travelers Cheques from 
18 J the American Express Office in Toronto, Canada. The 
19 I cheques are identified also on page five of the Final 
20 I Pretrial Order. The American Express purchase agreement 
21 J form that it typically uses was in fact used in this case 
22 J and a copy of that is attached to the Final Pretrial 
23 Order. 
24 I The plaintiff reported to the defendants on 
25 June 8, 1990 and to the police on June 9, 1990 that the 
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1 I travelers cheques were lost or stolen. The defendant and 
2 I the police commenced an investigation after that time. 
3 I The plaintiff made written demand on the defendant for 
4 J refund for lost or stolen travelers cheques of $99,000. 
5 I The written demand was dated June 17, 1990, and was made 
6 I on the defendant's form, receipt for refund for lost or 
7 I stolen travelers cheques bearing the number of E0007361. 
8 I The defendant refused and continues to refuse to issue 
9 I replacement cheques or cash to plaintiff of $99,000. 
10 I Each cheque speaks for itself. The checks show 
11 I that $39,000 worth were cashed at 13 different locations 
12 in the Toronto area on May 31, 1990. That $18,000 worth 
13 J were cashed at six different locations in the Toronto 
14 area on June 1, 1990, and that $9,000 worth were cashed 
15 J at two different locations on June 4, 1990, and that 
16 J $21,000 were cashed at two different locations on June 7, 
17 1990. A total of $87,000 in cheques had been cashed at 
18 J 23 different locations to-date. 
19 I On Friday, September 21, 1990, the document 
20 J section of the Forensic Identification Services of the 
21 J Metropolitan Toronto Police Department received from the 
22 I fraud squad 178 American Express Travelers Cheques valued 
23 at $87,000. Mr. Gordon Myers, the fingerprint 
24 I technician, examined the cheques for fingerprints and he 
25 I identified the prints of Mr. Paul Pauze on the cheques 
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1 that are identified under paragraph M in the Pretrial 
2 I Order. The prints of Mr. Pauze were found on checks 
3 purchased on both May 8 and May 30, 1990. 
4 I The stories of the parties as to what happened 
5 to these cheques, obviously are very much in dispute. 
6 I The plaintiff claims he purchased the $17,000 in cheques 
7 I for the potential purchase of machinery at an auction in 
8 I Canada. He did not attend this auction. When he 
9 purchased the remaining $87,000 in cheques at or about 
10 J 1:00 p.m. on May 30, he testified he put both batches of 
11 J cheques in his briefcase and put the briefcase in the 
12 I trunk of his car. The remaining $87,000 was to be used 
13 according to the plaintiff to take to Sweden for him to 
14 attend an auction there with the idea of purchasing 
15 J equipment there. When he returned on May 30 to his 
16 I office at 5:00 p.m., he claims that the cheques were 
17 still in his briefcase in the trunk of his car. 
18 I From Thursday, May 30, through June 3rd, when 
19 I the plaintiff travelled to Sweden, he claims that the 
20 J briefcase with the cheques were still in the trunk of the 
21 I car, and there was no evidence that the car was broken 
22 I into. There was testimony that the car trunk could be 
23 I opened without a key. 
24 On June 3rd plaintiff testified that his 
25 I suitcase — that he put his suitcase on the plane to 
ko 
1 J Sweden and he carried his briefcase on the plane. He 
2 J never checked to see if the cheques were still in his 
3 briefcase. On June 4 he went through customs, taking the 
4 J briefcase to his room and claims he never opened it. 
5 On June 5 he drove to the mine site in Sweden, 
6 I but never checked to see that the cheques were in the 
7 briefcase, was still in the briefcase. He put the 
8 briefcase, he said, in the trunk of his rental car and 
9 I left it there while he was inspecting the mine site. He 
10 I did not purchase anything in Sweden. 
11 I He returned to Toronto on June 6 and still did 
12 I not verify that the cheques were in his briefcase. From 
13 June 6 until June 8th, he did not bother to check to see 
14 J if the cheques were still in his briefcase in the trunk 
15 I of his car. 
16 J On June, I believe it was June 8th, he took the 
17 I briefcase to work and for the first time he said that the 
18 I cheques — he looked into the briefcase to discover 
19 I whether the cheques were in the briefcase. 
20 I Then this is the report he gave to the claims 
21 I investigator and to the police when he filed his claims: 
22 J The plaintiff claims that no one knew that he had cheques 
23 J or where they were. He reported this to the police 
24 officer, Peter Baxter, on July 17, 1990. He said he 
25 I didn't allow anyone to touch the cheques. 
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1 J The plaintiff has associated and been a friend 
2 I of Paul Pauze for ten years. Mr. Pauze's prints were 
3 I found on 12 of the cheques. Mr. Pauze was subsequently 
4 J criminally charged in connection with these cheques and 
5 I Paul Pauze told the police that defendant had brought the 
6 briefcase into Mr. Nicholls* office and that the 
7 J plaintiff had opened the briefcase and permitted Pauze to 
8 J handle some of the cheques. Pauze did not mention at the 
9 J time he reported this to Mr. Baxter that anyone other 
10 I than the plaintiff was present at this time. 
11 I At the trial, Len Jones, a friend and business 
12 J associate of Mr. Nicholls, testified that he was also 
13 J present. However, Mr. Pauze neglected to mention this to 
14 the police officer when he was questioned. And certainly 
15 I Mr. Jones would have been a good alibi witness for him at 
16 I that time. 
17 J There was also testimony at trial that Mr. 
18 I Pauze was identified by some of the bank tellers as the 
19 person who counter-signed and cashed the travelers 
20 I cheques. 
21 I Mr. Nicholls incorporated Lift Truck Center in 
22 I Canada in 1984. He was the president and the only 
23 J officer and shareholder which apparently is permitted in 
24 I Canada. He was the company's only full time employee, 
25 I although he did have a younger brother who worked for him 
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1 I at this company. 
2 On September 30, 1991, Mr. Nicholls testified 
3 I that he was forced to close the operations of the 
4 I company; but prior to closing Lift Truck Center, he 
5 I started Lift Truck Sales and Service Corporation, leased 
6 I new premises across the street, and across from Lift 
7 I Truck Center, and then moved five trucks across the 
8 street and loaned the business $22,000. He sold shares, 
9 his shares in the company for $1 to his brother. 
10 Evidently, this is almost virtually without 
11 J consideration. Certainly without any meaningful 
12 I consideration. Mr. Nicholls became general manager of 
13 I this corporation at $35,000 a year, basically ran the 
14 I corporation, although his brother was president of it. 
15 I His brother basically was the mechanic for the 
16 I corporation. 
17 Since May 30, 1990, Mr. Nicholls repaid a loan 
18 J to Debbie Jones in the amount of $20,000. Made purchases 
19 in the amount of approximately $17,000. He had a $75,000 
20 I line of credit he used to finance operations of the 
21 I business and he paid off this line of credit in August of 
22 I 1990, at a time when he was claiming financial duress, 
23 I even though the bank had not made a demand and this came 
24 I at a time, as I indicated, that he said he was forced to 
25 I close his business. 
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I I Mr. Nicholls' memory is superb on several 
2 I details in his life, except for some details pertaining 
3 to the $99,000 of cheques. It appears to the Court that 
4 Mr. Nicholls is a man of some reasonable or better than 
5 reasonable means, but nevertheless $99,000 was a 
6 significant amount of money in his financial life. 
7 His memory is superb on several details, as I 
8 indicated, including a meeting at the prosecutor 
9 Lustman's office, with the police officer, on his 1988 
10 conviction. But his memory is less clear on details 
11 I involving the $99,000. For example, whether he showed 
12 these cheques to Paul Pauze in his office. His memory is 
13 J very superb with regard to discussions with various 
14 people during the investigation of the cheques. 
15 I There was a previous incident with Canada Trust 
16 in 1990 where the plaintiff filed a claim that his Master 
17 Card had allegedly been stolen with 15 cash advances paid 
18 I over a 28-day period, totally $5,000. When he talked to 
19 the clerk and she informed him that the bank had a hidden 
20 camera, he then later called and said that he remembered 
21 J making those cash advances in the amount of $5,000. I 
22 J think this goes in part to the credibility of Mr. 
23 Nicholls. 
24 J Although there was evidence of previous 
25 I criminal offenses, as I indicated in court, the Court has 
1 disregarded any — absolutely disregarded evidence of any 
2 J convictions in 1971 or 1973. This is a conviction of 
3 pleading guilty to possession of stolen truck parts, but 
4 J I believe that this is only marginally relevant to this 
5 I particular case and I have not placed much weight on that 
6 particular conviction. 
7 I In this case, the burden of proof is on the 
8 I plaintiff to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the 
9 allegations that the plaintiff has made. In this case 
10 the Court simply does not find the plaintiff's story 
11 J credible or plausible. In a business the size of Mr. 
12 J Nicholls, it is not believable that someone would leave 
13 J $99,000 in travelers cheques in a briefcase in a trunk 
14 I which could be opened without a key for days on end and 
15 J not even check on them while on a business purchasing 
16 I trip overseas. I simply don't find that credible or 
17 I believable. 
18 J Also, the plaintiff's business associate and 
19 I friend for ten years, had fingerprints on several cheques 
20 I and there was evidence that he cashed some of these 
21 J cheques. I believe that there is a very strong suspicion 
22 J of conspiracy between Mr. Nicholls and Mr. Pauze, and 
23 perhaps even Mr. Jones, and maybe even his brother, and 
24 I those are the others I believe the plaintiff is entitled 
25 I to look to in support of their theory. 
**5 
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Mr. Nicholls testified that his business 
finances were disastrous in the summer of 1990. He 
nevertheless opened a new business and virtually gave 
ownership to his brother without consideration or the 
consideration being for one dollar. 
As far as evidence of Mr. Nicholls' lack of 
credibility, he did testify in court that in this 
conversation that police officer Baxter taped that Baxter 
screamed and threatened him and demanded that he sign 
this willsay statement. There was certainly no evidence 
of that in the case. Mr. Nicholls has not acted as a 
victim in this case, nor did he in my view for several of 
the arguments that Mr. Roche made as a victim in the 
preliminary hearing of Mr. Pauze. And while his memory 
is very good on certain things, he couldn't even remember 
whether he actually purchased these cheques or counter-
signed these cheques. I simply find that unbelievable. 
I conclude that there is no credible evidence 
to support the plaintiff's proposition that these cheques 
were lost or stolen. I also believe that this action was 
brought in bad faith. The plaintiff is not therefore 
entitled to recover on any theory that he has claimed. I 
believe that the plaintiff is attempting to defraud 
American Express and has breached his contract with them. 
Therefore, the Court renders judgment against the 
kS 
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1 plaintiff and in favor of the defendant. 
2 J With regard to the attorney's fees requested by 
3 J American Express, there has been no dispute as to whether 
4 they are reasonable and necessary, and the Court finds 
5 J that they are reasonable and necessary incurred as are 
6 I the costs in this action. However, with regard as to 
7 whether I award attorney's fees, I would like the cites 
8 of those cases again and I will reserve that issue and 
9 J issue a written opinion. So what are those case 
10 I citations again? 
11 MR. ROCHE: Cady vs. Johnson, 671 Pac.2d 149, 
12 Utah Supreme Court 1983. Jeschke vs. Willis, 811 Pac.2d 
13 202, Court of Appeals 1991. 
14 THE COURT: All right. 
15 MR. ROCHE: Your Honor, I have got extra 
16 I copies. 
17 THE COURT: All right, that will be fine. I am 
18 I going to take that under advisement, though. I need to 
19 J read those cases and then I will issue a written decision 
20 I with regard to those. 
21 J Mr. Roche and Mr. Webber, I want you to prepare 
22 J proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
23 consistent with the Court's findings today and the ruling 
24 I that I have made. Is there anything else, counsel? 
25 MR. ANDERSON: I don't believe so, Your Honor. 
**7 
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1 I Thank you. 
2 MR. ROCHE: No, Your Honor. 
3 THE COURT: I know this is a harsh judgment 
4 against the plaintiff. I want Mr. Nicholls to know that 
5 I this case was very vigorously advocated in his behalf and 
6 J I do wish to reiterate again I compliment all counsel in 
7 the case. The Court is in recess. 
8 (End of Judge's Ruling.) 
9 | * * * * * 
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